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Abstract 
The idea and study of international society can be applied empirically to Europe and the Europe Union (EU), with 
a significant overlap between the idea of Europe and the EU being symbolized as EUrope. As the example of 
EUrope demonstrates, the development of international society genuinely depends upon violence in its peripheries, 
in EUrope’s case exemplified by colonialism and imperialism of European states: states of which most are now 
core members of the European Union, but until only some 50 years ago have been fierce and violent colonizers of 
the world. As such, the study of Europe and the EU is ontologically linked to the study of colonialism and 
post-colonialism what founds and necessitates epistemologically an historical and comparative approach. The 
refusal of this ontology and epistemology may enable to study internal policy processes, but would remain within 
self-centric and solipsistic foci on the European ‘Self’ and would thus block systematically all attempts to 
interrelate the EU to the world. Such a refusal would further render it impossible to envision the EU as an 
international or even global actor conducting policies other than hegemonic and paternalistic (even if 
self-understood as benevolent).  
Keywords: international society, English school, post-colonial theory, EU, Europe, violence, geopolitics, core, 
peripheries 
1. Introduction 
‘International Society’, as promoted mainly by Martin Wight and Hedley Bull (Note 1), describes an historically 
oscillating movement between cooperation among a group of states, expansion, detraction, and globalization. 
Whatever stage ‘international society’ may be/might have been in, historically and present-day, the center of this 
movement seems to be, and to have been, the Western world and Europe and their export, and/or superimposition, 
for the better or worse, of Western/European political, cultural, and legal standards on non-European/non-Western 
‘states’ (Note 2) – among which not all have been or are states in the European meaning, but empires, monarchic 
kingdoms, tribes, nomadic societies, etc. The inequality among state relations and the violence, sometimes also 
war, which are inherent in these movements, appear to be manifest in what Bull (most explicitly, but also others) 
called the ‘institutions’ of international society and their ‘functions’ (see Bull, 1977). However, the political 
violence, which represents an inherent part of the movements of international society, is an under-conscious and 
under-thematized aspect of international society and the respective discussions in the literature which can be 
linked to the so-called English School.  
This paper shall therefore be focusing on the aspect of violence as part of the emergence and development of 
international society. To put it differently, without violence there would be no international society, and hence I 
will be arguing that violence is and has been an incremental part of international society and its movements (Note 
3). Those patterns of violence, however, are shifting. They are informed by patterns of physical, or direct, forms of 
violence – foremost materialized in historical imperialistic and colonial movements of international society – and 
of structural and cultural forms of violence. Thus, forms of violence of the international society are multilayered, 
and in historical imperialism and colonialism the use of physical violence was accompanied, if not based upon 
cultural and discursive patterns of anthropological stigmatizations and racist discrimination as well as that forms of 
structural and cultural violence are still present in contemporary international relations and their many 
post-colonial legacies. The disappearance of direct/physical violence is certainly not the case for international 
politics in general, but if international society is understood as a form of intensified cooperation among states 
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based on common organizations, then the pattern of physical violence can be said to have disappeared in respective 
contexts (Note 4).  
The terminology used so far may already have suggested that I will be using Johan Galtung’s differentiation of 
violence into the three forms of direct (i.e. physical), structural, and cultural violence (Note 5); while we see some 
similarity between the last one and the form of violence which emerges through the analytical lenses of Edward 
Said’s Orientalism-argument and Foucauldian discourse analysis (Note 6). 
I shall discuss three forms of violence in international society exerted through physical/direct, structural, and 
discourse/cultural formations. Apart from present-day forms of international society among legally – not though 
politically – equal states, where physical violence almost disappeared and formations of structural and discourse 
violence appear to dominate (such as in the European Union [EU], in ASEAN or NAFTA as well as in their 
external relations), all three forms of violence interplay and mutually support each other in all other cases, 
historically in manifestations of imperialism and colonialism and contemporarily in politics of building 
international society.  
2. “International Society” and the Study of Violence 
Johan Galtung, founder of the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO), its director from 1953 until 
1969, and from 1969 to 1978 professor for peace and conflict research at the University of Oslo, developed a 
typology of forms of violence. He distinguished three major patterns, or ‘super-types’ as he also calls them (see 
Galtung, 1990: 294). These patterns refer to violence according to their phenomenology and manifestation as 
direct, structural, and cultural, with the latter two being conceived of also as psychological (‘working on the soul’) 
while direct violence is physical and personal (‘working on the body’ as Galtung argues (1968: 169). Between 
physical and psychological violence is an interesting link in that the threat of physical violence is perceived by 
Galtung as an act of (psychological) violence which falls within his comprehensive definition of violence ‘since it 
constraints human action’ (1969: 170). Since threats of violence (may they aim at direct, structural, or cultural acts 
of violence) are executed via structural and/or cultural violence, there is a further link between these three main 
patterns of direct, structural, and cultural violence (Note 7). Before this link shall be discussed at the end of this 
section, the concept of violence must be discussed first whereby this link will become clearer. 
First, it has to be asked why Galtung occupies himself with typologies, categorizations, and empirical 
exemplifications of violence when his actual interest lies in peace studies and the elaboration of conditions of 
peace and the avoidance of violence respectively. He gives an illustrative metaphor in order to explain this 
occupation by comparing the role of the study of violence for peace studies with the study of pathology for health 
studies: they both occupy themselves with disturbing reasons of what is aspired and with what is located at the 
opposite of the desired: health here, and peace there, and pathologies and violence respectively as the disturbing 
(see Galtung, 1990). Consequently, the more types and phenomena of violence are knowable and understandable, 
and the more comprehensively they are known and understood, the more effective possibilities there are to 
counteract them and to tackle their roots in order to accomplish peace and or a more peaceable world, including 
strategies for conflict settlement and resolution. The study of violence is hence seen as a necessary step for finally 
accomplishing a higher goal; at the same time, however, it is an endlessly wide field since phenomena of violence 
are widespread in their character and manifold in their causes, effects, and interrelations. And it is exactly for this 
wideness and manifoldness that Galtung deliberately rejects any narrow concept of violence which would only and 
mainly aim at intended physical violence of an identifiable actor. He notes that ‘(if) this were everything violence 
is about, and peace seen as its negation, then too little is rejected when peace is held up as an ideal. Highly 
unacceptable social orders would still be compatible with peace. Hence, an extended concept of violence is 
indispensable’ (1969: 168). 
The idea of the manifoldness of violence, and the interrelations between such manifoldnesses, will give birth to 
Galtung’s three super-types of physical/direct/personal, structural, and (later in his career also) cultural violence. 
But what is to be understood as violence itself which then becomes manifest in these three types? Here, Galtung 
develops a definition of violence which is supposed to be open enough to grasp its widespread character and 
expressions. He notes: ‘Violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic 
and mental realizations are below their potential realizations’ (1969: 168). This definition appears so 
comprehensive that it is difficult to think of any sphere, dimensions, or agency in the social and political realm 
which would not fall under the rubric of violence. Some specification is necessary, and Galtung, aware of this, 
introduces the criterion of avoidability and un-avoidability of such influences, understood not deterministically or 
by nature, but by social and/or political action. Accordingly, violence is further specified as the cause of the 
difference between the potential and the actual, between what could have been and what is. Violence then is that 
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which in-creases the distance between the potential and the actual, and that which impedes the decrease of this 
distance. Thus, if a person died from tuberculosis in the eighteenth century it would be hard to conceive of this as 
violence since it might have been quite unavoidable, but if he dies from it today, despite all the medical resources 
in the world, then violence is present according to his definition (1969: 168).  
In other words: when influences prevail, which ‘constrain human action’ and which contribute to the impossibility 
of the full realization of (one’s) human life needs, but which are avoidable through social and political action and 
which would need not to occur according to means over which social and political actors dispose, then violence is 
present. As such, violence is located within the realm of social and political order and action. If negative influences 
on the conduct of human life are unavoidable in their occurrences, such as earthquakes or hurricanes, then there is 
no violence; if, however, after the occurrence of such an incident, help (such as evacuation, food, sanitation, etc.) is 
not being provided most comprehensively to support the realization of life needs of the people harmed, then 
violence is present (Note 8). It is clear from this understanding that the presence and amount of violence are 
directly related to questions of equality/inequality, justice/injustice, and power over resources and 
decision-making. This may be illustrated by a further, contemporary example:  
Every day x-thousand of people die or become infected from the HIV-virus worldwide; the circumstances of these 
infections may have or may not have causes related to violence (sometimes they certainly have as in cases of direct 
violence over the body of others such as rape or prostitution). The circumstance that medication against 
HIV-infection is available and in Western societies most infections can meanwhile become cured with a good 
chance that the virus does not affect the immune system, that people infected in foremost African countries, 
however, are cut off this medication – thus the constrains on their lives and health were avoidable – by being not 
made available certain resources and by not disposing over power in decision-making processes, which are 
responsible for their being cut off from necessary medication, would be to be perceived (and condemned) as a 
phenomenon of violence (Note 9). Since for the exertion of this kind of violence no single person or distinct group 
of persons may be responsible or accountable, Galtung calls this type of violence, i.e. where no clear actor is 
identifiable, structural violence: ‘We shall refer to the type of violence where there is an actor that commits the 
violence as personal or direct, and to violence where there is no such actor as structural or indirect’ (1969: 170). 
And further he notes: ‘Personal violence shows (…) structural violence is silent, it does not show’ (1969: 173). 
When we follow Galtung and disassociate the presence and exertion of violence from distinct agency and from a 
clearly identifiable actor, either the concept of violence turns into a self-perpetuating argument accusing and 
blaming everything and everyone, or, and that in order to keep the concept analytically valuable, we have to 
disassociate the concept of violence principally from the idea of individual guilt and responsibility. Saying this, 
does not mean that we would not be able to declare guilt and responsibility in certain cases of violence (which is 
particularly important in a legal and ethical perspective), implies, however, that we cannot do so instantly and 
always. Referring to the example above, the circumstance that millions of people are cut off from necessary 
HIV-medication may be due not to the decision of a single, namable person, but most probably may be due to a 
spectrum of manifold and complex structures of capitalist economies that are operating in and governing the 
free-market system of pharmacy production and distribution, world trade, and development policies. As Galtung 
says, sometimes violence is silent, but nevertheless there and maybe most effective. On the other hand though, 
even if dropping the idea of guilt and responsibility, we accomplish a most important analytical tool to detect 
violence even, and especially when there is no one particular actor behind its exertion since associating violence 
only and always with a distinct actor behind it does not allow to see many phenomena which, too, fall into 
Galtung’s definition of avoidable constrains of human action and humans’ realization of life needs. And finally, 
structures are of a different nature than a human person as actor, but, too, provide a tangible picture of both the 
occurrence and the causes of violence. Examples are: constrains of national political and economic systems 
causing inequalities of, and discriminations against, certain parts of the population; political and economic 
principles and rules of an international society which discriminate against other nations that do not belong to this 
international society or are in the peripheries of its organizational and power center; certain mechanisms of 
decision-making in national or international institutions and their effects on those who are not part of the 
decision-making circles; degrees of possession over natural resources and production means and their function as 
access venues on international markets and for acceptance and membership in international organizations; group 
and state hierarchies; militarization; inside/outside-identities, -discriminations, and -rationalities with regard to 
nationalism, ethnicity, race, gender; etc. etc. 
Galtung’s ‘violence triangle’ is complemented by a third category, that of cultural violence. Cultural violence 
shares with structural violence the characteristic that there is no clearly identifiable individual actor or group of 
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actors behind the exertion of violence ‘acts’, rather ‘aspects of culture’ operate as legitimizing reasons for 
personal/direct/physical and/or structural violence. When Galtung notes that  
‘(by) cultural violence we mean those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence 
– exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal 
science (logic and mathematics) – that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural 
violence’ (1990: 291)  
and that further 
‘The study of cultural violence highlights the way in which the act of direct violence and the 
fact of structural violence are legitimized and thus rendered acceptable in society. One way 
cultural violence works is by changing the moral color of an act (…) (another) by making 
reality opaque so that we do not see the violent act or fact, or at least not as violent’ (1990: 
292)  
We are resembled of Michel Foucault’s discourse analyses of power, particularly its repressive forms (read: 
violence) (Note 10). Especially in Madness and Civilization (1967), The Order of Things (1970), The Birth of the 
Clinic (1973), Discipline and Punish (1995) and herein by his concept of panopticism Foucault sensitizes his 
audience for the aspects of social and political power which are (sometimes the constitutive and at the same time 
repressive) part of what we take and accept as normal, even natural, while the narratives on what is ‘normal’ and 
‘natural’ and their dominance or weakness are again the result of power struggles and discourses. Thus, there are 
interests at play which manipulate both the reality according to those interests and our perceptions of this ‘reality’ 
which, in the words of Frederick Cooper and Laura Ann Stoller create a reality ‘in order to act upon it’ (1997: 11). 
Galtung’s wordings that cultural violence makes reality ‘opaque’ and ‘makes direct and structural violence look, 
even feel right – or at least not wrong’ (1990: 291) are in line with the aspects of the creation and manipulation of 
reality and perceptions and narratives of/on ‘this’ reality à la Foucault; and even more similarity between their 
analytical foci and lenses becomes obvious when we look at the realms of their analyses.  
We are all more or less familiar with the empirical foci which we (can) derive from Foucault’s concept of discourse. 
Having a closer look at what according to Galtung exemplifies cultural power – namely religion, ideology, 
language, art, empirical and formal science (read ‘modes of rationality’) – and what he suggests as empirical foci 
for the analysis of cultural power, one wonders why there are not more cross-references in secondary literature 
between the oeuvre of both authors or immediate mutual references between both (Note 11). Anyway, Galtung 
mentions some instances for whose analysis the concept of cultural violence can be used and by whose application 
we become aware of patterns of how violence (i.e. direct/physical and structural violence) is being legitimized 
through notions/perceptions/teachings/stories/world views/narratives in and by religion, ideology, language, art, 
empirical and formal science (i.e. discourses): some of the instances may be listed here since they can contribute – 
together with the instances of structural violence above – to develop more precise ideas on what an analysis of 
EUrope, which merges the study of international society and post-colonialism and herby on cultural violence, may 
focus on. Such an analysis would encompass phenomena like prejudice; sanitation of language; militarism; 
neoclassical economic doctrine of comparative advantage and its rationality (Note 12); perceptions of 
modernization and progress here, and backwardness there where ‘modernization, development, and progress are 
seen as apodictic [and] not to believe in them reflects badly on the non-believer, not on the belief’ (1990: 298); 
politics where ‘one country sets the tone for others’ (ibid.) such as in contemporary politics conditionality; and 
further to these, all kinds of ‘cultural elements’ of which can be shown that they are being used ‘empirically or 
potentially (…) to legitimize direct or structural violence’ (ibid.).  
3. EUrope and the Study of Colonial and Post-colonial History 
Studying the European Union and the developments of international society from a European core into 
non-European peripheries from a historical and comparative perspective evinces a profound paradox which 
becomes most virulent and problematic in the EU’s self-understanding as a benevolent actor: eight of its 27 current 
members with this eight being among the core and longest members of the Union (namely France, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, and Portugal) have, until just recently, a history and political 
legacy as the world’s fiercest and as most violent colonizers and imperial powers, carving deep memories, harm, 
and vulnerabilities into violated peoples’ collective memories, while the EU, supported by a large field of 
mainstream EU scholarship, perceives of itself as a normative civil power and benevolent international and global 
actor. That the EU’s rhetoric of European governance as a model of global governance may give raise to profound 
anxieties and resistances among previously colonized states with, at the same time, an obvious naivety of EU 
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actors about their own benevolence and reception/perception around the world, manifests and exemplifies the 
paradox mentioned.  
This paradox is what Dipesh Chakrabarty has in mind when he speaks of ‘asymmetric ignorance’ and refers 
herewith to the ‘dominance of “Europe” as the subject of all histories’ (2000: 28, 29). The list of phenomena, 
which would need to be analyzed under the rubric of cultural violence according to Galtung, requires extension 
through a spectrum of additional foci when the study of violence is being merged with a post-colonial perspective 
on the international society of Europe and the EU. Chakrabarty helps us in suggesting such foci when arguing that 
political modernity itself is a thoroughly European thought model linked to ‘concepts such as citizenship, the state, 
civil society, public sphere, human rights, equality before the law, the individual, the distinction between public 
and private, the idea of the subject, democracy, popular sovereignty, social justice, [and] scientific rationality’ 
which would ‘all bear the burden of European thought and history’ (2000: 4). Since those concepts are not just 
tools which could be willfully chosen, or not, from a range of alternatives by European policy-makers and social 
scientists in their making of politics and their writing history, rather they have accomplished the rank as the global 
‘condition under which politics is being made and under which historical knowledge is produced’ itself (2000: 29) 
in and by Europe as well as throughout the world, we face two consequences of this paradox:  
First, EU policy makers and scholarship who operate not on a profound comparative and historical basis, but rather 
engage self-centristically the study of ‘domestic’, i.e. EU, policy processes on the basis of a ‘post-ontological’ (so 
Caporaso (Note 13)) self-understanding cannot but be naïve with regard to understanding EU politics 
(enlargement, for example) as merely benevolent paternalism (instead of critically asking for perceptions of others 
and eventual post-colonial implications) since their knowledge production is fundamentally trapped in those 
conditions under which Europe always performs as THE subject of (global) history. At the same time, this 
mechanism and this conditionality of own knowledge (production) and political agency do not become visible and 
tangible to them. And, secondly, every perspective from around the world finds itself in conditions of structural 
subalternity – or “everyday symptom” of subalternity, as Chakrabarty writes (2000: 29) – towards as well as in 
resistance against those European modes of knowledge production and policy making.  
It is difficult to see somewhere on the horizon that this paradox with its long-standing historical legacies and 
burdens would have came to an end – neither with respect to non-European subalternity, nor with respect to 
European paternalism – rather than carries on into contemporary EU politics. Chakrabarty’s term of a “hyperreal 
Europe” is very instructive here which would have been constructed by the “tales that both nationalism and 
imperialism have told the colonized” (2000: 41) – a term which applies in a historical comparison immediately to 
the EU Eastern enlargement policy of 2004 and respective discourses initiated by the EU around EU benevolence 
and the benefit of EU membership for Eastern Europe; while at the same time then leading EU politicians, 
foremost the EU commissioner for Enlargement, Guenther Verheugen, and the president of the EU commission, 
Romano Prodi, as well as mainstream EU scholarship would have responded with surprise and dismay when 
confronted with critical perspectives and alternative perceptions of their enlargement politics (see, for example, 
Boeroecz 2001) due to their intellectual containment and persistent belief in the “Europe as the subject of history”- 
narrative and respective knowledge productions, particularly with regard to visions of modernity and 
modernization, historical progress and teleology, and economic development (Note 14).  
We appear to have therefore convincing reasons to study the movements of European international society as 
manifestations of forms of post-colonial violence and Galtung’s typology as discussed above may be very helpful 
here. This applicability of concepts of political violence in looking at Europe and the EU – i.e. this perspective of 
post-colonial ‘asymmetric ignorance’ – appears to have unequally more validity when viewed from European 
peripheries while at the same time seemingly enjoying no validity within the political and scholarly elites who 
reside within the core of European knowledge production and the historical subjectivity of EUrope. However, this 
is not an indication of the wrongness or mistakenness of what could be called critical EUropean studies, bringing 
together EU studies, post-colonialism, and the study of international society, rather than another, now geopolitical 
manifestation of asymmetric power relations between EUropean core and peripheries – a core which is ironically 
identical more or less with the eight colonizing states of European history (as mentioned in the beginning of this 
section) and peripheries which assemble the victims of European colonial and imperial history.  
When approaching the “Europe as the subject of history”- narrative and respective knowledge productions as well 
as their persistence into the 21st century more specifically with Galtung’s typology, we recognize that this narrative 
leads to and conditions violence on all the three dimensions of direct, structural, and cultural violence; with again 
the historical focus on these dimensions representing the fundamental ontology of the study of Europe and the 
European Union. Such a study suggests that the dimension of direct violence, which flew from the “Europe as the 
subject of history”-narrative, has been a basic pillar of European expansion, using strategies and techniques of 
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colonial and imperial war and subjugating and annihilating thousands of peoples and vast civilizations in the 
Middle East, Central Asia, East and South East Asia, Africa, and South and North America. Those techniques and 
strategies appear meanwhile to belong to history even though they played a major role in the movements of 
European international society far into the 20th century. A historical study of European international society 
through the centuries from the 1500s to the European Union applying Galtung’s typology of violence reveals, 
however, even more that with an end of direct violence the narrative of Europe as the subject of history did not stop 
to be violent at all. 
One of the heuristic advantages of Galtung’s types of structural and cultural violence – as discussed above in 
section 2) in greater detail – consists in the ability to see and to decipher elements of violence which we would not 
be able to recognize if we had not such a comprehensive concept of violence. A concept of violence, which would 
reduce violence to phenomena of physical force, would not be able to detect elements of violence which are 
continuing to expose non-European peoples to European/EUropean politics, even after physical/direct violence 
came to an end mainly with the processes of de-colonization after the Second World War and especially UN 
Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960 by the United Nations General Assembly. However, and we see this by applying the 
types of structural and cultural violence, violence carried on and continues to influence the relations between 
Europe/EUrope and the world. This continuation of violence between Europe/EUrope and former colonies around 
the world in form of structural and cultural violence is the main platform of all kinds of post-colonial theory and 
respective empirical studies. Speaking with Galtung, when structural violence is violence ‘built in’ political, 
economic, bureaucratic, and social structures, it is then the analysis of those structures in terms of inequalities 
between Europe/EUrope and the world which deciphers structural violence: as violence that is produced, 
supported, and fueled by those structures. And, as mentioned above, Galtung’s type of cultural violence is 
congruent with Foucault’s concept of discursive power (as force and domination) in that cultural violence 
manifests and is being articulated in social and political discourses – such as state symbols and iconographies; 
anthems; literature; linguistic codes; political speeches and political semantics; popular culture; etc. – which either 
serve directly, or are being instrumentalized for, the legitimization of direct and/or structural violence; and are as 
such to be seen as violent themselves.  
With regard to the EU, structural and cultural violence – or, with Chakrabarty: ‘asymmetric ignorances’ – against 
and towards ‘peripheral’ states and regions can be found and demonstrated in a multitude of politics ranging from 
neo-liberal economy and free market ideologies, to hypocrisies of democracy promotion and human rights policies, 
to European Neighbourhood Policies, to the EC/EU acquis communautaire, to finally all politics of identity 
creation (ideas of ‘Europeaness’) as they become expressed in EUropean immigration politics (see amongst others 
Behr, 2005). One of the most pregnant examples of structurally and culturally violent EU policies is certainly its 
Eastern enlargement of 2004 and (are and) have been the social, political, and economic discourse and structures 
accompanying and supporting the unification of ‘old’ EUrope with ten new (Eastern) member states. 
As argued by a distinctively critical body of literature (see amongst others Behr, 2007; Boeroecz, 2001; Burgess, 
1997; Diez, 1999; Engelbrekt, 2002; Kovacs, 2001; Kovacs/ Kabachnik 2001; Phillipson, 1992, 2002; Ugur, 
1995), EU institutions, and foremost the EU Commission and the then commissioner for enlargement, Guenther 
Verheugen, have initiated a political discourse in the run-up to the Eastern enlargement of the Union (which just 
recently has experienced another step with the finalization of membership negotiations on June 30, 2011, with 
Croatia) which constructed a binary reality for Eastern European states consisting of either EU membership or 
chaos, anarchy, and poverty as future prospects. Thus, a development was portrayed for those states which 
depicted only one viable and ‘rational’ trajectory for their future, and this was eventual EU membership. In order 
to accomplish such membership, however, Eastern European states had to undergo a profound procedure of 
transformation according to the economic and political rationalities of ‘old’, or ‘core’ EUrope.  
The key regulation for new members was laid down in the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty (1992), Title VIII, 
Article 49 which determines that ‘each European state’ can apply for membership in the European Union under 
the condition of observing and guaranteeing the basic political principles laid down in Article 6, paragraph 1 of 
the Treaty: the states keen to join the Union must guarantee freedom, democracy, human rights, and rule of law, 
as well as the basic political rights of the Rome Convention of Human Rights and Basic Freedoms of 4 
November 1950. Title VIII, Article 49 further specifies that with each state applying for membership distinct 
accession treaties must be contracted. The European Council in Copenhagen concretized the regulations for 
accession and passed the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ in 1993. The paramount request was institutional stability to 
guarantee democratic rule of law and basic human rights; second, a free market economy had to be established, 
including the capacity to withstand economic competition in the Union; and third, the new states were required 
to take care of all obligations of membership as well as of the objectives of the political and economic Union. 
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The third criterion aims at the adoption of the ‘acquis communautaire’. Until the accessions of 2004 became 
effective, the ‘acquis communautaire’ steadily developed, and in 2001 encompassed some 90,000 pages of 
regulations by the Commission, as well as the precedents of the European Court of Justice over the last 50 years; 
all joint declarations and conclusions of the Union regarding common foreign and security politics and home and 
justice affairs; all international agreements of the Union with third countries; all intergovernmental agreements 
among single member states of the Union; and finally, all principles of primary EU law stemming from the 
Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice (Note 15). 
Thus, primarily the EU commission discursively created a distinct reality in order to (be able to) act upon it while 
the adaptation and transformation process of Eastern European states according to Western EUropean economic 
and political standards and rationalities must be seen as an epitome of structural violence: violence built-in the 
structures of adaptation and transformation: economic, bureaucratic, political, and social structures to be 
implemented in Eastern European states in order to ‘successfully’ accomplish transformation and to be assessed by 
the EU commission as ripe for earning membership status (Note 16). 
Respective enlargement politics and their structurally violent impacts have been embedded in and legitimized by 
political discourses which promoted EU accession as THE only rational, viable, and sustainable path for the 
development of Eastern Europe as a whole and Eastern European states after their independence from the Soviet 
Union. Because those discourses reduced alternative ways and options for their development to one dimension – 
i.e. EU membership – and thus helped to legitimize the individual politics of accession as discussed above, these 
discourses are to be seen as forms of cultural violence. It is noteworthy, however, that this discourse has been 
supported by Eastern European states themselves applying for EU membership during the 1990s. Thus, we find 
two conceptual features fulfilled here: firstly, Galtung’s explanation that neither structural nor cultural violence 
would have a clearly identifiable actor who is accountable and to could be blamed so that at best a multitude of 
discourse participants can be named; and, secondly, the explanation of Chakrabarty for the ‘success’ of 
colonialism, namely that the values and rationalities of the colonizer need to be – and as he empirically 
demonstrates looking at India – embraced by local elites (2000: 4), seems to apply, too, to EU enlargement which 
was not only unilaterally promoted by leading Western European EU member states, but also by Eastern European 
applicant (and later EU member) states.  
The most significant nature of the political discourse surrounding EU enlargement politics as legitimizing the 
structural violence of adaptation and transformation processes – in short: of EU politics of conditionality towards 
Eastern Europe –, which made it so powerful and at the same time reinforced the legitimization of structural 
aspects of EU accession and membership, are its metaphysics of a historiographic teleology and its geopolitical 
underpinnings. Through both, politics is becoming reified and what is indeed a political construction – i.e. the 
building of international society more generally, and EU integration more particularly – appears as naturalness and 
historic-political inevitability. EU Eastern enlargement of 2004 appears as the fulfillment of the laws of history and 
accordingly as the only reasonable and meaningful course of action after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
Warsaw Bloc (for more detailed analysis, see Behr, 2007; Diez, 1999; as examples Prodi, 2000; Verheugen, 2000). 
4. Conclusions: History, Violence and “Peripheries” 
Scholarship, which wants to critically engage the contemporary European construction of international society and 
EU integration, must take into account two conceptual necessities: first, it needs to built upon an historical 
ontology of Europe from times of colonialism and imperialism to present-day; and, secondly, within the context of 
respective studies, the focus on international society – i.e. here EU and English School scholarship – should meet 
colonial and post-colonial theory. From such perspectives, the movements of every international society and thus, 
too, of the European Union can be deciphered as forms of asymmetric ignorance and ultimately violence exerted 
from a core of states of a specific international society over its peripheries. 
The direction of movement of international society into, and the exertion of power and violence from the core over, 
peripheries suggests a concluding geopolitical figure for critical EU studies. The breading of violence of the 
“Europe as the subject of history”-narrative and its post-colonial persistences are accompanied by a division of the 
world into imaginations of core and peripheries. The geographical imaginations of core and periphery are thereby 
not neutral at all, but charged with hierarchical thinking assuming and promoting steadily declining political power 
and significance the further the international society stretches into ‘its’/the peripheries. Even though member of 
one and the same international society, the peripheral parts find themselves in a sub-altern role. This is as true for 
colonial and post-colonial relations between EUrope and the world as it is true for the relations even within the 
European Union as several politics of membership graduation and unequal treaties demonstrate.  
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The political strategy of unequal treaties between core states and peripheries – a well known power tool from 19th 
century imperialism and the so-called ‘standards of civilization’ (see Gong, 1984) – became manifest, for example, 
in restrictions of free movement for citizens of the new member states of the 2004 enlargement for the first seven 
years of their membership in the Union. Those restrictions were enacted by the EU even though the new member 
states had incorporated the Union’s acquis communautaire in full, fulfilled all treaty obligations, and free 
movement is supposed to be and indeed was a right of all (other, i.e. ‘old’) member states’ citizens according to the 
Schengen Agreement. Unequal treaties, which have been concluded between European and non-European states in 
the centuries of European colonialism and imperialism and which also occur within the international society of the 
European Union and their underlying geopolitical core-periphery imaginations are thus another articulation of 
inequality, discrimination, and asymmetric power relations (for further discussions see Ansell/Di Palma 2004). 
To sum up: history, violence, and periphery appear as the analytical and conceptual triad for critical EU 
scholarship where the study of international society meets colonial and post-colonial theory. It appears that EU 
scholarship with a primary European and policy oriented focus carries on the colonial and imperial narrative of 
Europe as the subject of history and is thus compelled to remain Euro-centric. Such scholarship and respective 
understandings of the Union ignore not only the past and the legacies of the Union itself, but continue to keep 
Europe with itself, neglecting Europe’s own (historically grounded) contingency. Europe defined and found itself 
always via a constructed non-European ‘Other’ while throughout most of Europe’s history those processes of 
definition where explicitly violent (in terms of direct, physical violence). Two lessons may be suggested to be 
learned: first, neither Europe, nor the EU, nor European studies can and should renounce the relation between 
Europe/EUrope and the world and the understanding (and critical analysis) of respective mutual processes of 
interpreting the ‘Other’ and of identity building; secondly, those processes, analyses, understandings, 
interpretations, and their practices and techniques not only have to take the ‘Other’, the non-European, seriously 
into consideration, but further to this EUrope has to open itself explicitly up towards ‘its’ peripheries and 
sub-alternities in order to overcome its histories, legacies, and present-day practices of violence. Europe and the 
EU can redeem their own contingencies and surmount their political and cultural centrisms and hierarchies only 
through the constant transformation of EUrope’s ‘Self(s)’ via an expressive glasnost towards non-European 
‘Others’ – at the end of which process the desirable destabilization of binaries may possibly loom. 
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Notes 
Note 1. For several reasons it is hard to speak of a ‘concept’ of international society, too many incoherencies, 
historical and theoretical, and even conceptual contradictions exist; for a critical appraisal see, amongst others, 
Behr, 2010; Shaw, 1992; James, 1993. 
Note 2. See hereto, amongst others, Gong, 1984; Bull/Watson, 1984. 
Note 3. Finally, one has to ask whether, and if yes, why not only the reality, but also the notion of ‘international 
society’ itself as academically and politically solidified framework is inherently based upon and pervaded by 
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violence due to the genuine character of inequality of and within the international system made up by modern 
system of (i.e. in this context post-19th Century) sovereign states (see on this for example Walker, 2002) as well 
as due to the Hegelian notion of self-centric and solipsistic recognition which underlies the English School 
thinking (see on this for example Behr, 2010, III.2). 
Note 4. Interesting though are cases where and when cooperation and cooperative behavior is demanded as in 
incidents of politics towards what is called ‘failed states’, as contemporarily in Iraq and Afghanistan, and 
formerly in Somalia (according to the UN mandate in 1993). Here, the pattern of physical violence for the 
built-up of international society, with regard to its intended emergence so to say, has certainly not disap-peared. 
Note 5. See Galtung, 1990; 1969; 1971; 1978. 
Note 6. For Foucault see 1967, 1970, 1973, 1995, for Said see 1978. 
Note 7. It seems that this link between threats of violence, which are to be perceived as (acts of) violence, and 
structural and cultural violence is somewhat of a blind spot in Galtung’s conceptualizations which clearly 
elaborate the typologies of violence and their interrelations, however, seem to forget clarification on threats of 
violence as a type of violence further to the mere statement that they are (to be perceived as) violence. Since 
threats of (each kind of) violence are, however, conditioned by, depend upon, and relate to, structural and/or 
cultural violence as the carriers of those threats, structural and cultural violence are both forms of violence itself 
as well as the conditions of the possibility of direct/physical/personal violence at the same time. Thus, it seems 
that structural and cultural violence always hold the potential of developing into, and preparing for, 
physical/direct/personal violence. 
Note 8. The hurricane Katrina in New Orleans and its disastrous aftermath are a poignant example in this case. 
Note 9. See comparable the argument on water and water politics developed in Castro, 2006. Another example 
of structural violence is the domination of markets and local economies in Africa by European products through 
EU price politics whereby EU products, particularly highly subsidized agricultural products, are cheaper than 
local products and local market structures and economies becoming destroyed. 
Note 10. It is important, though seems often to be overlooked when contemporary social scientists work ‘with 
Foucault’, that power does not necessarily and always have a negative connotation and consequence in Foucault. 
It certainly can, but power and power struggles also contribute to the creation of knowledge, an at least 
ambivalent function since knowledge, itself ambivalent, can be used in repressive ways (i.e. in a violent manner) 
and, too, in, and as, liberating strategies. 
Note 11. One of the few authors who relates Foucault’s concept of discourse and power to Galtung’s typology of 
‘cultural violence’ is Solà Martín, 2005. 
Note 12. In this regard Galtung notes: ‘One example of cultural violence would be the neoclassical economic 
doc-trine, understanding itself as the science of economic activity … Thus, (The) doctrine of comparative 
ad-vantages serves as a justification for a rough division of the world in terms of the degree of processing which 
countries impart to their export products (…) the principle of comparative advantages sentences countries to stay 
where the production-factor profile has landed them, for geographical and historical rea-son (…) And thus it is 
that the ‘law’ of comparative advantages legitimizes a structurally intolerable status quo. In short, this ‘law’ is a 
piece of cultural violence buried in the very core of economics’ (1990: 300, 301).  
Note 13. On the panel “The Uses of History and Historical Comparison for Critical EU Studies” at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association APSA in Washington DC, September 2010, James 
Caporaso criticized as discussant the use of history and historical comparison for EU studies as anachronistic 
because of ontological and recommended ‘post-ontology’, i.e. focusing on policy processes, to the author as 
panacea for EU scholarship. 
Note 14. See on those discourses more below. 
Note 15. See ‘Communication from the Commission’, ‘A Project for the European Union’, Brussels, May 22, 
2002, COM [2002] 247 final. In this regard it is important to distinguish between primary and secondary EU law: 
whereas the requirement for prospective member states to adopt to all of the abovementioned EU properties (the 
‘acquis’) is just secondary law as this requirement relates to the Presidency Conclusion of Copenhagen in 1993, 
only the basic political principles laid down in Title VIII and Article 6, Treaty of Maastricht are primary EU law. 
And just as primary EU law is compulsory in legal terms, it can be con-cluded that the requirement for 
standardization by adopting the ‘acquis’ is of a political nature. It is as such not obligatory in legal terms, but is, 
however, of undoubtedly political weight. 
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Note 16. Following Frederick Cooper and Laura Ann Stoler, these monitoring and evaluation procedures can be 
compared with the tradition of imperial bureaucracy in the nineteenth century that ‘occupied itself with 
classifying people and their attributes; with censuses, surveys, and ethnographies; with recording transactions, 
marking space, establishing routines, and standardizing practices’ (Cooper and Stoler, 1997: 11). This 
comparison reveals a common feature of European politics of standardization in the 19th century (see Gong, 
1984) and EU politics, including its underlying political thought. It emphasizes the construction and organization 
of ‘authoritative knowledge’ – a means employed by powerful political actors to pre-construct reality and to 
formulate a particular vision of the political world in order to act upon it. The more such constructions are 
politically formalized and institutionalized, which is the case in the highly dynamic EU system, the better it 
serves the execution of real power.24 The surveys, progress reports and opinions on each membership candidate 
published on the EU web-page prior to their accession in May 2004, exemplify such practices of authoritative 
classifying. 
